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AVERTING ROBOT EYES 
MARGOT E. KAMINSKI, MATTHEW RUEBEN, 
WILLIAM D. SMART, CINDY M. GRIMM* 
ABSTRACT 
 Home robots will cause privacy harms.  At the same time, they 
can provide beneficial services—as long as consumers trust them.  
This Essay evaluates potential technological solutions that could 
help home robots keep their promises, avert their eyes, and other-
wise mitigate privacy harms.  Our goals are to inform regulators 
of robot-related privacy harms and the available technological 
tools for mitigating them, and to spur technologists to employ ex-
isting tools and develop new ones by articulating principles for 
avoiding privacy harms. 
 We posit that home robots will raise privacy problems of three 
basic types: (1) data privacy problems; (2) boundary management 
problems; and (3) social/relational problems.  Technological de-
sign can ward off, if not fully prevent, a number of these harms.  
We propose five principles for home robots and privacy design: 
data minimization, purpose specifications, use limitations, honest 
anthropomorphism, and dynamic feedback and participation.  We 
review current research into privacy-sensitive robotics, evaluating 
what technological solutions are feasible and where the harder 
problems lie.  We close by contemplating legal frameworks that 
might encourage the implementation of such design, while also 
recognizing the potential costs of regulation at these early stages 
of the technology. 
INTRODUCTION 
The home is a quintessentially private location under U.S. law.  The 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution explicitly protects “houses.”1  
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 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
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The Supreme Court noted that “the very core” of the Fourth Amendment is 
“the right . . . to retreat into . . . [the] home” and has repeatedly protected pri-
vacy there.2  Yet a host of technologies and new uses of technology—the 
Internet of Things,3 smart grids,4 home robots5—threaten that tradition of 
home privacy. 
This Essay focuses on home robots and the privacy harms they pose.  
Rather than looking solely to legal solutions, it joins a growing chorus of 
voices emphasizing the importance of technological design.6  Design can mit-
igate or prevent privacy harms.  Privacy protection can be baked into a tech-
nology.  We posit that if home robots are to be widely trusted, accepted, and 
adopted, roboticists will need to build them with privacy in mind.  We aim 
both to inform regulators of the range of robot-related privacy harms and 
available technological tools for mitigating them, and to spur technologists 
to develop new tools by articulating principles for avoiding privacy harms. 
First, we identify the types of privacy harms home robots raise.  We then 
survey technologies that could mitigate privacy harms by home robots and 
outline research into privacy-sensitive robotics.  We explain what types of 
technologies are more feasible for application to privacy-sensitive robotics in 
the near future, and what types are more remote.  We close by returning to 
the law, to ask whether legal frameworks can nudge or encourage these tech-
nological adoptions—and to address the risks of trying to regulate at this rel-
atively early stage. 
If robots are to be accepted into peoples’ homes, they will need to learn 
to give notice of surveillance, to make and keep their promises, and to avert 
                                                          
 2.  Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 How-
ell’s State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–30 (1886)); see also 
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); 
Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Dietemann 
v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971)); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 202 n.1 (1890) (noting that English courts held sacred the right to 
privacy within the home). 
 3.  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 836–40 (2016); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First 
Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 108–
12, 132–33 (2014). 
 4.  See generally Andrew Paverd et al., Security and Privacy in Smart Grid Demand Response 
Systems, in SMART GRID SECURITY 1 (Jorge Cuellared ed., 2014) (ebook); Andrew Paverd et al., 
Privacy-Enhanced Bi-Directional Communication in the Smart Grid Using Trusted Computing, 
2014 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON SMART GRID COMM. 872. 
 5.   See generally Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785 
(2015); Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. 
REV. 661 (2015). 
 6.  See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jennifer King, Bridging the Gap Between Privacy and Design, 
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 989 (2012); Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1409 (2011). See also WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO 
CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (forthcoming 2018). 
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their eyes.  This Essay takes the first step of spelling out what this might mean 
with respect to robot design. 
I.  ROBOT PRIVACY HARMS 
Home robots are coming; some are already here.  They bring with them 
a range of privacy concerns.  Robots think and act only after sensing their 
environment.  That environmental sensing—and the storage and sharing of 
that information with operators and other watchers—inevitably implicates 
privacy.  Here we describe various types of home robots, identify some prom-
inent possible privacy harms, and briefly summarize why current law does 
not protect people from these harms. 
A.  Home Robots 
 Generally, a robot is defined by three features: it senses, thinks, and 
acts.7  Robots can be independent actors or remotely operated.  Both types of 
robots can raise privacy concerns.  We here offer concrete examples of cur-
rent home robots, noting that future robots are more likely to be adopted and 
accepted if companies can better mitigate privacy concerns. 
In 2007, Bill Gates of Microsoft called for a “robot in every home.”8  
Many homes, it turns out, already have one.  Cleaning robots are widely 
available for sale, ranging from the iRobot Roomba 980,9 to the Dyson 360 
Eye Robot Vacuum,10 the Toshiba Smarbo,11 the Looj gutter cleaner,12 and 
the Neato Botvac D3.13  There is a cat litter box robot, the Litter-Robot III, 
which self-cleans and has a night light for elderly kitties.14  Even your in-
                                                          
 7.  Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529 (2015).  
 8.  Bill Gates, A Robot in Every Home, SCI. AM., Jan. 2007, at 58, https://www.scientificamer-
ican.com/article/a-robot-in-every-home/.  
 9.   iRobot Roomba 980 Robotic Vacuum Cleaner, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/iRo-
bot-Roomba-Robotic-Vacuum-Cleaner/dp/B013E9L4ZS (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 10.  Explore the Dyson 360 Eye, DYSON, http://www.dyson.com/vacuum-cleaners/robot/dy-
son-360-eye.aspx (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 11.  Evan Ackerman, Toshiba Smarbo Vacuum Has Twice the Smarts, but Does It Matter?, 
IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 25, 2011, 10:55 AM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/home-
robots/toshiba-smarbo-vacuum-has-twice-the-smarts-but-does-it-matter.  
 12.  iRobot Looj 330 Robotic Gutter Cleaner, FRONTGATE, http://www.frontgate.com/irobot-
looj-330-robotic-gutter-cleaner/531816 (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 13.  Botvac D3 Connected, NEATO, https://www.neatorobotics.com/robot-vacuum/botvac-con-
nected-series/botvac-d3-connected/ (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 14.  Litter-Robot III Open Air, LITTER-ROBOT, https://www.litter-robot.com/litter-robot-iii-
open-air.html (last visited May 17, 2017).  There are some amazing reviews on Amazon for inter-
ested purchasers: “My cats DID love this, but now they just crap on the floor because it’s always 
turning the wrong way, not emptying properly, and making loud cracking noises.”  Cecilia, Works 
Great, Until It Doesn’t, Review of Litter-Robot III Open-Air – Automatic Self-Cleaning Litter Box, 
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creasingly intelligent dishwasher or refrigerator could at this point be char-
acterized as a specific-purpose robot15: it senses, and it acts, although it does 
not move.16 
To understand why even cleaning robots raise privacy problems, it is 
helpful to understand how they work.  There are, of course, robots explicitly 
designed for surveillance, like the Riley, the home-monitoring robot (adver-
tised as giving you “eyes in the back of your head”17) but it is important to 
understand how robots designed for other purposes still implicate surveil-
lance concerns. 
 For example, the iRobot Roomba 980 is designed to clean a room.  It 
navigates based on Visual Simultaneous Localization and Mapping 
(“VSLAM”),18 as do the Toshiba Smarbo, the LG Hom-bot, the Neato, and 
the Dyson 360 Eye.19  VSLAM works roughly as follows: the Roomba 980 
has a camera on top of it that takes a picture of the environment.  Then, using 
VSLAM software, the Roomba 980 searches for distinctive patterns, such as 
the edges of a couch.  The robot continues to move and take images, remem-
bering previous features and eventually building a picture-based map.  To 
function, the robot needs to figure out its location within this map.  Thus the 
Roomba 980 also collects its location information relative to its starting 
point—a process known as odometry.20 
                                                          
AMAZON (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-reviews/RS863PYP2SFUU/ref 
=cm_cr_arp_d_rvw_ttl?ie=UTF8&ASIN=B01601QF2O. 
 15.  Nick Lavars, Samsung’s New Smart Fridge Lets You Check in on Its Contents Through 
Internal Cameras, NEW ATLAS (Jan. 6, 2016), http://newatlas.com/samsung-family-hub-smart-
fridge/41192/ (discussing a fridge that takes a picture of its own insides whenever you close the 
door, which you can access on your phone when you are at the store to see what you need to buy).  
 16.  Erico Guizzo, Astro Teller, Captain of Moonshots at X, On the Future of AI, Robots, and 
Coffeemakers, IEEE SPECTRUM (Dec. 8, 2016, 5:39 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/ro-
botics/artificial-intelligence/astro-teller-captain-of-moonshots-at-x#qaTopicSeven. 
 17.  Riley, A Smarter Robot, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/riley-a-smarter-
robot-drone-security (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 18.  Evan Ackerman & Erico Guizzo, iRobot Brings Visual Mapping and Navigation to the 
Roomba 980, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 16, 2015, 8:30 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/ro-
botics/home-robots/irobot-brings-visual-mapping-and-navigation-to-the-roomba-980. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id.  
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The Roomba 980 capturing & mapping its environment.  Photo: iRobot21 
 
 Colin Angle, CEO and co-founder of iRobot, explains that with 
VSLAM, “we can create digital representations of what a home looks like so 
our robots can be smarter.”22  This map might include virtual walls that pre-
vent the robot from running into things like pet food dishes or from going 
into locations you do not want cleaned or entered.  It also means, however, 
that your Roomba detects when you have moved furniture, where your baby’s 
crib is, and where you keep your safe.  Your Roomba does not actually know 
what these items are—it knows they are obstacles—but a human looking at 
the images would.  Moreover, if your Roomba knows where you do not want 
it to go, those virtual walls could indicate that something interesting or secret 
is behind them.  That very indication is, arguably, private information.23 
 It is up for debate whether this more efficient form of navigation, 
which allows for single-pass cleaning of an area, actually offers an improve-
ment over older cleaning methods, like random multi-pass cleaning.  Pseudo-
random cleaning methods, which older Roombas employed, may arguably be 
more thorough, if less efficient.24  But the trend in cleaning robots is towards 
using VSLAM. 
                                                          
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Matthew Rueben & William D. Smart, Privacy in Human-Robot Interaction: Survey and 
Future Work 17, 32 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://robots.law.miami.edu/2016/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/07/Rueben_Smart_PrivacyInHRI_WeRobot2016.pdf. 
 24.  Ackerman, supra note 11.  Ackerman explains:  
[A] robot vacuum can operate in one of two ways: pseudo-randomly, like a Roomba, or 
using a mapping pattern, like a Neato.  iRobot’s method involves multiple cleaning passes 
to clean better (maybe) at the expense of efficiency, while Neato’s method covers most 
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Robotic toys are also increasing in popularity and intelligence, and raise 
privacy problems.  The Pleo, an adorable baby dinosaur that owners raise and 
train, is “[a]ble to hear, to see, to sense touch, and to detect objects”—in ad-
dition to coo endearingly.25  Hello Barbie, released in 2015, uses a micro-
phone to record conversations that are then transmitted to company servers, 
converted to text files, analyzed, and responded to, using scripted lines.26  
Hello Barbie talks with and listens to your children.  Robotic toys present 
social engineering concerns, because their owners can form attachments.  
Sony first sold its Aibo, a robotic dog, in 1999.  When Sony retired the Aibo 
after its fifth generation and stopped offering repairs, owners mourned as 
their robotic dogs “died.”27  A human with a high degree of attachment to a 
robotic toy could be persuaded to buy upgrades or disclose sensitive infor-
mation. 
 
 
The Pleo28 
 
Hello Barbie29 
 
The Sony Aibo30 
 
 
                                                          
areas of your floor approximately once.  Obviously, the Neato is much faster, so if speed 
is what you want, go with a vacuum that makes a map. 
Id.  
 25.  PLEO RB Autonomous Robot Life Form, ROBOTSHOP, http://www.robot-
shop.com/en/pleo-rb-autonomous-robot-life-form.html (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 26.  James Vlahos, Barbie Wants to Get to Know Your Child, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 16, 
2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/magazine/barbie-wants-to-get-to-know-your-child.html. 
 27.  Chris Mills, Sony’s Robotic Dogs Are Dying a Slow and Heartbreaking Death, GIZMODO 
(June 18, 2015), http://gizmodo.com/sonys-robotic-dogs-are-dying-a-slow-and-heartbreaking-d-
1712160637; Jonathan Soble, A Robotic Dog’s Mortality, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/technology/robotica-sony-aibo-robotic-dog-mortality.html. 
 28.  Petew, Pleo, Your Very Own Dinosaur, GADGETSPEAK (Nov. 24, 2008), 
https://www.gadgetspeak.com/gadget/article.rhtm/755/558783/Pleo_-_your_very_own_dino-
saur.html. 
 29.  Hello Barbie Doll, TOYSRUS, http://www.toysrus.com/buy/fashion-dolls/hello-barbie-
doll-dkf74-71369646 (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 30.  Sony Aibo Images, JOCELYN IRESON-PAINE, http://www.j-paine.org/dobbs/aibo_im-
ages.html (last visited May 17, 2017).  
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Robotic toys illustrate a host of what are arguably privacy issues.  They 
sense and record their environment and owners; they share that information 
with companies and potentially with third parties; they raise cybersecurity 
issues (they can be hacked)31; and they elicit complex emotional responses 
from their owners/subjects, including both affection and potentially mis-
placed trust.32  Some toy robots are explicitly advertised for their surveillance 
capabilities: Toys“R”Us advertises the Mebo as being able to “even spy on 
your family if you want him to!”33 
 Toys can be considered a subset of the broader category of social ro-
bots, which raise many of the same concerns.  The Wakamaru robot was de-
signed by Mitsubishi to be the “world’s first household robot.”34  Combining 
image recognition technology with technology from Mitsubishi’s robot arm 
division, Wakamaru was intended to “help humans by interacting.”35  De-
signers envisioned the robot as being capable of doing everything from wak-
ing its owner up in the morning, to describing weather conditions and dictat-
ing email, to simply providing social companionship.  Due to its rather 
limited capabilities, however, Wakamaru was not an overwhelming suc-
cess.36 
 
                                                          
 31.  Samuel Gibbs, Hackers Can Hijack Wi-Fi Hello Barbie to Spy on Your Children, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2015, 6:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2015/nov/26/hackers-can-hijack-wi-fi-hello-barbie-to-spy-on-your-children.  
 32.  Ryan Calo, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOTIC ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 188, 195, 197 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012); Hartzog, supra note 
5, at 801 (pointing out that robots may be “specifically designed to extract personal information 
through social engineering”); Kaminski, supra note 5, at 664 (noting that “robots’ social features 
may elicit trust where trust is not deserved”).  
 33.  Mebo Robotic Claw Interactive Robot, TOYSRUS, http://www.toysrus.com/product/in-
dex.jsp?productId=91846186 (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 34.  World’s First Practical Home-use Robot, MITSUBISHI MONITOR, Feb. & Mar. 2006, 
https://www.mitsubishi.com/mpac/e/monitor/back/0602/story.html.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Paul Miller, Mitsubishi’s Wakamaru Bot Isn’t Ready to Integrate into Society, ENGADGET 
(July 29, 2007), https://www.engadget.com/2007/07/29/mitsubishis-wakamaru-bot-isnt-ready-to-
integrate-into-society/. 
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Wakamaru, the “world’s first household robot.”37 
 
 Some social robots have specifically therapeutic purposes.  PARO, a 
robotic baby harp seal, is described by its makers as a “[t]herapeutic 
[r]obot.”38  It is intended to treat patients with Alzheimer’s disease and other 
forms of dementia—users who may lack the ability to tell it is a robot.39  
PARO has five different kinds of sensors: tactile, light, audition, temperature, 
and posture sensors.  It can recognize light and dark, feel strokes or strikes, 
and recognize the direction of a voice and words.  PARO learns and remem-
bers its name.  It also remembers previous actions and tries to repeat positive 
actions to be petted, and eschew bad actions to avoid being struck.  Hasbro 
has created a far less complex and less expensive therapy cat, the Joy for All 
Companion Pet, which responds to being petted but does not appear to gather 
and store as much information about its environment or user.40 
 
 
                                                          
 37.  World’s First Practical Home-use Robot, supra note 34.  
 38.  PARO Therapeutic Robot, PARO, http://www.parorobots.com/ (last visited May 17, 
2017). 
 39.  Brittany A. Roston, Study Finds Robotic Paro Seal Is Therapeutic for Dementia Patients, 
SLASH GEAR (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.slashgear.com/study-finds-robotic-paro-seal-is-therapeu-
tic-for-dementia-patients-06435184/. 
 40.  Andy Newman, Therapy Cats for Dementia Patients, Batteries Included, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/nyregion/robotic-therapy-cats-dementia.html.  The 
cat, which costs $99.99, appears to have motion sensors and touch sensors, but it lacks audio or 
facial recognition.  Orange Tabby Cat, HASBRO, http://joyforall.hasbro.com/en-us/companion-cats 
(last visited May 17, 2017).   
 2017] AVERTING ROBOT EYES 991 
 
PARO, a robotic baby harp seal.41 
 
More recent home robots like Pepper and JIBO are similarly envisioned 
as social companions but are designed for general-purpose domestic interac-
tion.42  JIBO uses machine learning and learns by listening to humans, and it 
employs facial recognition.43  Pepper, a humanoid in design, has four direc-
tional microphones on its head, a 3D camera and two HD cameras, and an 
“emotion engine” whereby he can “identify your emotions by your voice as 
well as the expressions on your face.”44  The more often Pepper sees a par-
ticular face, the more accurate its detection of emotions will be.45 
 
 
Pepper, a social companion robot.46 
 
Mayfield Robotics offers Kuri, a home robot with “emotive . . . adora-
ble” eyes that “can even recognize faces and monitor your home when you’re 
not there.”47  Kuri has a microphone and sound-detection technology, can 
learn a home’s floor plan and the timing of household activities, and pos-
sesses entertainment capabilities: you “can even send her into your kids’ 
room to tell a bedtime story.”48  Kuri’s designers sought to ensure the robot 
                                                          
 41.  Roston, supra note 39.  
 42.  April Glaser, Jibo is Like Alexa and a Puppy Inside One Adorable Robot, WIRED (June 28, 
2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/jibo-like-alexa-puppy-inside-one-adorable-robot/. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Find Out More About Pepper, SOFTBANK ROBOTICS, https://www.ald.softbankrobot-
ics.com/en/cool-robots/pepper/find-out-more-about-pepper (last visited May 17, 2017); see also Al-
thea Chang, At CES: Robots That Can Recognize if You’re Sad, CNBC (Jan. 7, 2016), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/07/at-ces-robots-that-can-recognize-if-youre-sad.html. 
 45.  Chang, supra note 44.  
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Life with Kuri, KURI, https://www.heykuri.com/living-with-a-personal-robot (last visited 
May 17, 2017).  
 48.  Id.  
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was “not necessarily optimally efficient or functional, but . . . was approach-
able, calming and inviting.”49  They prioritized human interaction over effi-
ciency, and wanted users to trust the robot, not be unnerved by it. 
 
 
 
Kuri, interacting with a child.50 
 
Both therapeutic and general-purpose social robots raise similar issues 
to robotic toys.  They record their environment, store and share information, 
can potentially be hacked, and deliberately engage with their owners’ emo-
tions.51  For both robotic toys and social robots, privacy concerns can poten-
tially prevent widespread adoption. 
 Take Hello Barbie as an example.  Privacy concerns about the doll 
received considerable press attention.52  One article asked, “Is Hello Barbie 
eavesdropping on your kids?” 53  Another explained that hackers could hijack 
Barbie and use her for surveillance.54  The Campaign for a Commercial Free 
Childhood launched a campaign against Hello Barbie, explaining that “[k]ids 
using ‘Hello Barbie’ won’t only be talking to a doll, they’ll be talking directly 
                                                          
 49.  Darrell Etherington, Home Robot Kuri Is like an Amazon Echo Designed by Pixar, 
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 3, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/03/home-robot-kuri-is-like-an-ama-
zon-echo-designed-by-pixar/. 
 50.  Life with Kuri, supra note 47.  
 51.  Elaine Sedenberg, John Chuang & Deirdre Mulligan, Designing Commercial Therapeutic 
Robots for Privacy Preserving Systems and Ethical Research Practices Within the Home, 8 INT’L 
J. SOC. ROBOTICS 575, 575–79 (2016). 
 52.  See, for example, the following commentaries: Lori Andrews, Hello Barbie, Goodbye Pri-
vacy, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 27, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/com-
mentary/ct-hello-barbie-privacy-icloud-perspec-20151127-story.html, and Sarah Halzack, Privacy 
Advocates Try to Keep ‘Creepy,’ ‘Eavesdropping’ Hello Barbie from Hitting Shelves, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/11/privacy-advo-
cates-try-to-keep-creepy-eavesdropping-hello-barbie-from-hitting-shelves/. 
 53.  Susan Linn, Is Hello Barbie Eavesdropping on Your Kids?, CNN (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/04/opinions/linn-hello-barbie-privacy/. 
 54.  Gibbs, supra note 31.  
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to a toy conglomerate whose only interest in them is financial.”55  The toy 
ultimately did not perform as hoped, generating publicity but not the hoped-
for sales.56  While the poor sales could also be attributed to other glitches like 
a “shaky” Internet connection,57  privacy concerns likely played a part.  Pri-
vacy concerns may also preclude distribution to markets where privacy is 
taken more seriously.  For example, Germany recently banned the “My 
Friend Cayla” doll, an interactive toy that allegedly transmits recorded con-
versations to a voice recognition company in the United States, citing privacy 
concerns.58 
 Joining a growing cadre of scholars that emphasizes the necessity of 
trust in the information age, we contend home robots will be widely adopted 
only if users can trust that their information will not be illicitly gathered, 
shared, or misused.59  Amazon appears to agree: it recently filed a motion to 
quash a search warrant directed at obtaining information gathered by the Am-
azon Echo, arguing that “rumors of an Orwellian federal criminal investiga-
tion into the reading habits of Amazon’s customers could frighten countless 
potential customers.”60 
                                                          
 55.  Leigh Weingus, Talking Barbie Could Eavesdrop on Kids, Critics Warn, HUFF. POST (Mar. 
11, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/11/wifi-barbie_n_6847736.html (quoting Cam-
paign for a Commercial Free Childhood, Stop Mattel’s “Hello Barbie” Eavesdropping Doll, 
http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/action/stop-mattel%E2%80%99s-hello-barbie-eaves-
dropping-doll (last visited May 17, 2017)). 
 56.  Matthew Townsend, Hello Barbie Pleads ‘Buy Me’ As Mattel Doll Fails to Catch Fire, 
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-20/hello-
barbie-pleads-buy-me-as-mattel-doll-fails-to-catch-fire. 
 57.  Paul R. La Monica, Nobody Puts Barbie in a Corner. Mattel Soars, CNN MONEY (Feb. 2, 
2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/02/investing/mattel-earnings-barbie/ (describing Hello Bar-
bie as “a little bit creepy”).  For context, La Monica’s article was written when Mattel announced 
growth around the holidays in 2015.  See Matthew Townsend, Barbie’s Holiday Sales Grow for 
First Time in Four Years, BLOOMBERG (updated Feb. 2, 2016, 4:20 PM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2016-02-01/mattel-earnings-top-estimates-as-barbie-shows-signs-of-re-
bound; Townsend, supra note 56 (“Hello Barbie generated the most buzz the toymaker has received 
in years, if not decades.  But for the most part, it’s been a dud.”). 
 58.  Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Germany Bans ‘My Friend Cayla’ Doll Over Spying Concerns 
(NPR radio broadcast Feb. 20, 2017, 4:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/tran-
script.php?storyId=516292295. 
 59.  See Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1183, 1187 (2016) (“My goal, in other words, is to shift the focus of the First Amendment arguments 
about privacy from the kind of information to the kinds of relationships—relationships of trust and 
confidence—that governments may regulate in the interests of privacy.”); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, 
Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 613 & n.5 (2015); Neil Richards & 
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 432, 434 
(2016). 
 60.  Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 14, 
State of Arkansas v. James A. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Feb. 17, 2017 (quoting In 
Re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com dated August 6, 2007, 246 F.R.D. 570, 573 (W.D. Wis. 
2007)). This motion has since been dropped, as the suspect agreed to hand over recordings.  Eliott 
C. McLaughlin, Suspect OKs Amazon to Hand Over Echo Recordings in Murder Case, CNN (Apr. 
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B.  Robot Privacy Harms 
 What do we mean when we talk about robot privacy harms?  Privacy 
has been defined in a wide range of ways, from control, to decisional auton-
omy, to complex taxonomies of privacy violations.61  Home robots poten-
tially raise a number of different privacy harms.  As illustrated above, robots 
gather, process, share, and store information.  While not intending to be ex-
haustive, we posit that robots raise privacy problems of three basic types: (1) 
data privacy problems; (2) boundary management problems; and (3) so-
cial/relational problems.  While robots also implicate cybersecurity concerns, 
those are largely outside the scope of this Essay, which focuses on harms 
arising from normal operation without the intervention of malicious parties.62 
 First, robots, like a wide range of sensor-laden technologies, raise a 
host of data privacy concerns.63  These concerns are provoked by the gather-
ing, sharing, and storage of both sensitive information and information from 
which sensitive inferences can be drawn.  Concerns are also raised by sharing 
information out of context in a way that functionally makes that information 
sensitive.64 
 Perhaps most obviously, robots may directly gather recognizably sen-
sitive information from the home environment.65  A robot might photograph 
a prescription bottle or overhear a conversation about a cancer diagnosis.  It 
might record your child’s conversation or capture a picture of your latest bank 
balance.  United States federal privacy law is largely organized around pro-
tecting different classes of sensitive information—health information, finan-
cial information, information about children—and those classes of infor-
mation are likely to be implicated by recordings of the home.  As discussed 
below, however, U.S. privacy law is also largely limited to coverage of par-
ticular entities or particular relationships.  If you share your health infor-
mation with your doctor, she has privacy obligations.  If you share it with 
Google, such legal obligations likely do not attach.66  Users who expect legal 
                                                          
26, 2017, 2:52 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonville-arkan-
sas-murder-case/  
 61.  DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 10–11 (2008); Rueben & Smart, supra 
note 23, at 4–7. 
 62.  See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2013).  
 63.  See Sedenberg, Chuang & Mulligan, supra note 51, at 578 (discussing “Aspects of Infor-
mational Privacy Specific to Therapeutic Robots”). 
 64.  Id. at 580 (discussing contextual integrity). 
 65.  Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1128–29 (2015).  
 66.  To Whom Does the Privacy Rule Apply and Whom Will It Affect?, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr_06.asp (last visited May 17, 2017). 
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protection for sensitive information revealed to home robots may be unpleas-
antly surprised to find themselves without legal recourse. 
 Another classic data privacy concern arises from storage and analysis 
of bulk amounts of information.  Like most digital technology, home robots 
might “remember”—or really, store—information far longer than humans are 
calibrated to understand.  One of the ways in which we manage our social 
relationships is by spacing them out over time or by depending on the faulty 
memories of the people with whom we interact.67  By introducing temporal 
permanence into the home environment, home robots may collapse those in-
teractions and eliminate important relationship-management tools. 
 Storing information allows for data analysis, which also allows infer-
ences to be drawn about repeated behaviors.68  By recording large amounts 
of information, companies may be equipped to know what time daily showers 
happen or when homeowners are typically out of the house.  They might infer 
illness, vulnerability, or other changes in physical or emotional well-being 
that make users more susceptible to advertising or particular marketing ap-
peals.69  They might figure out and classify a homeowner’s religion or race, 
for potential use in targeted advertising.70  Robot users may fail to understand 
that they are in fact communicating sensitive information about themselves 
in these interactions.  When you interact with your dog, it does not remember 
everything, discern all patterns, or communicate sensitive information to oth-
ers.  When you interact with your robot dog, it may do all of these things. 
 Robots may, like other information technology, enable individuals or 
companies to take information that has been shared in one context and share 
or use it in another.  For example, if you ask your robot (or your search en-
gine) about the symptoms of an illness, you do not expect that information to 
be shared with, say, your employer or even online advertisers.  Helen Nis-
senbaum has articulated a theory of privacy as “contextual integrity” that 
                                                          
 67.  VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2011); Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113, 
1134 (2015).  
 68.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 1 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-under-
standing-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf. 
 69.  Sarah Gray, One Woman’s Attempt to Hide Her Pregnancy from Big Data—It’s More Dif-
ficult Than You’d Expect, SALON (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/04/28/one_wom-
ans_attempt_to_hide_her_pregnancy_from_big_data/; see also Sedenberg, Chuang & Mulligan, su-
pra note 51, at 579 (discussing how therapeutic robots might “infer psychological and mental 
states”). 
 70.  Sapna Maheshwari & Mike Isaac, Facebook Will Stop Some Ads from Targeting Users by 
Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/business/media/facebook-
will-stop-some-ads-from-targeting-users-by-race.html. 
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looks at information flows and their disruption.71  Robots may threaten pri-
vacy by threatening contextual integrity.72  They may fail to safeguard infor-
mation within a particular context and relatedly fail to alert users to the pos-
sibility that the context in which they share information may not be what it 
appears to be.  What looks like your empty living room may, with a robot 
present, in fact be a company server, a behavioral advertiser, or even a gov-
ernment agency. 
 The second class of robot privacy harms involve boundary manage-
ment problems.73  Robots might see through or move around barriers humans 
use to manage their privacy, or they might “see” things using senses humans 
would not know to guard against.74  Social psychologist Irwin Altman theo-
rized that privacy is the dynamic process of managing one’s social accessi-
bility using the tools of one’s environment.75  As one of us has discussed 
elsewhere at length, this model of privacy fits well with real-world surveil-
lance concerns.76  Where with no robot a person might rely on the walls of 
the rooms of her house to safeguard her privacy in a particular room, a robot 
that uses, say, thermal sensors may be able to “see” through the walls and 
render them ineffective.77  Even a robot’s ability to move around physical 
barriers—which your computer, for example, cannot do—renders those bar-
riers less effective as a tool for privacy management. 
 Robots may use sensors that humans do not expect to have to guard 
against, or are just not equipped to avoid.78  We may be good, or at least 
better, at guarding against visual surveillance, since we can generally see 
those who see us and adapt accordingly.79  If we see a robot staring at us in 
one room, we might move to another one.  But we may incorrectly assume 
that robots, especially those designed to be anthropomorphized, have similar 
                                                          
 71.  HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY 
OF SOCIAL LIFE 127, 128 (2010).  The Obama administration largely adopted this theory of privacy 
in a 2014 report encapsulated in the proposed, but not enacted, Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.  
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 19 
(2014) (“Respect for Context: Consumers have a right to expect that organizations will collect, use, 
and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in which consumers provide 
the data.”). 
 72.  See Sedenberg, Chuang & Mulligan, supra note 51, at 580. 
 73.  See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1975); Ka-
minski, supra note 67.  
 74.  Kaminski, supra note 5, at 661–63; Calo, supra note 32, at 192.  
 75.  ALTMAN, supra note 73. 
 76.  Kaminski, supra note 67, at 1113, 1117.  
 77.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001); see also Kaminski, supra note 67, at 1119.  
 78.  Marc J. Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped): Reconceiving First Amend-
ment Protection for Information Gathering in the Age of Google Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH L. 
REV. 115, 190 (2012). 
 79.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 34. 
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sensory abilities to humans.  Other sensors—from audio sensors to thermal 
imaging—may threaten our ability to manage our accessibility-slash-privacy 
because we are less well equipped, or not equipped at all, to guard against 
them.  Looking at an adorable robot, we may forget they have radar and ther-
mal sensors, and they are constantly sniffing the data packets coming from 
our phones.  Similarly, we may miscalibrate how audible we are to a robot in 
another room, expecting that it has human hearing levels when in fact it is 
capable of listening in with, for example, a laser Doppler vibrometer, which 
can hear a heartbeat at 300 yards.80  And we cannot make ourselves less vis-
ible to a thermal imager or know what we are revealing by moving the robot 
from place to place.  Home robots thus threaten privacy by recording using 
senses humans are not prepared to address. 
 The third category of privacy problems robots raise are the social/re-
lational problems raised by designing human-robot interactions against the 
backdrop of social behavior.  As discussed above, one of the more unique 
aspects of robots compared to other information technologies is their poten-
tial to develop social relationships with humans—or at least, to make humans 
feel and behave like a relationship exists.81  This has significant implications 
for privacy.  If you trust a robot, you might disclose more.82  You may feel 
like you are talking to your dog or friend when in fact you are talking to a 
corporation.83  Research also shows that the perceived persona of a robot can 
really matter; people may trust robots more if they perceive them as special-
ists,84 and disclose different kinds of information based on perceived gen-
der.85 
 Even failed design has privacy implications.  Robots may fail to ob-
serve personal space.86  Research has shown that people react to the invasion 
of personal space by artificial agents (that is, images of people) much as they 
do to invasions by actual people.87  Similarly, robots are known for having a 
                                                          
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Calo, supra note 7, at 545; Kate Darling, ‘Who’s Johnny?’ Anthropomorphic Framing in 
Human-Robot Interaction, Integration, and Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2588669.  
 82.  Calo, supra note 32, at 187, 188, 195, 197; Hartzog, supra note 5, at 801; Kaminski, supra 
note 5, at 664. 
 83.  Weingus, supra note 55.  
 84.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 2.  
 85.  Laura Dattaro, Bot Looks like a Lady, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2015, 1:12 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/robot_gender_is_it_bad_for_hu-
man_women.html; Aaron Powers et al., Eliciting Information from People with a Gendered Hu-
manoid Robot, 14 IEEE INT’L WORKSHOP ON ROBOT & HUMAN INTERACTIVE COMM. 158, 158–
59 (2005).  
 86.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 26.  
 87.  Id. at 2.  
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“constant gaze” problem: a constant stare that makes humans deeply uncom-
fortable.88  These in-person perceived privacy invasions may affect peoples’ 
behavior in the home, even if they do not reflect downstream information 
harms.  When designers try to work around these problems, this can also en-
able information privacy harms.  For example, designers are learning to lower 
robot eyes and keep robots out of your personal space, even as the machine 
is still actually recording.  This can send inaccurate messages to robot users, 
who may miscalibrate their behavior accordingly. 
 Robots’ failures to respond to social cues implicate information pri-
vacy in another way: social cues become a less effective method for manag-
ing social accessibility.  While a visitor to your home may understand from 
both broader social context and your specific actions that it is impermissible 
to record your child, or enter a bedroom, or go onto your computer, a robot 
will not read its environment in the same way.  You can and do control visitor 
behavior through social norms and social cues; your guidance to a robot will 
need to be more explicit and of a different kind. 
 Robots shield their operators from both social cues and social sanc-
tions.  Where a person may receive immediate social sanction for taking out 
their phone to record your child against your wishes, a robot’s operator, 
whether an individual or a company, is remote from that moment.  This cre-
ates a problem of dissociation for robot operators: the de-coupling of one’s 
body from one’s actions, making social signals that can already be challeng-
ing to discern in in-person interactions even more difficult or impossible to 
read remotely.89  Even well-meaning actors can be disinhibited by dissocia-
tion, and bad actors can no longer be directly shamed into behaving. 
 All of the above harms can have larger implications for society.  A 
lack of privacy can cause conformity and chilling effects.90  A loss of solitude 
in the home might have other psychological effects, removing an important 
reprieve from the busy world.91  Robot privacy harms will implicate all of the 
values implicated by privacy harms: autonomy, dignity, fairness, trust and 
intimacy, trust and sociality, democratic participation, and more.92 
                                                          
 88.  Id. at 24–25. 
 89.  Id. at 16. 
 90.  Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implica-
tions of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 467 (2015); Jonathon W. 
Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 
117 (2016). 
 91.  Calo, supra note 32, at 196 (“Privacy provides ‘a respite from the emotional stimulation of 
daily life’ that the presence of others inevitably engenders.” (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY 
AND FREEDOM 35 (1967)). 
 92.  See, e.g., Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, in LESSONS FROM THE 
IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 191, 196–98 
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C.  Why Current Law Is Not Enough 
Current U.S. law does not adequately protect against these privacy 
harms.  For one, there is no general federal data protection law in the United 
States, only industry-specific protection for particular kinds of information, 
usually hinging on particular relationships or targeting particular entities.  For 
example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”) protects individually identifiable health information under the 
Privacy Rule, but the Act applies only when that information is handled by 
“covered entities” or the business associates of covered entities.93  These en-
tities are defined as health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care 
providers.94  HIPAA does not cover most researchers, employers, life insur-
ers, schools, or many others.95 
Similarly, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) governs credit infor-
mation, but only when it is handled by “consumer reporting agenc[ies].”96  
Courts and government agencies have interpreted the term for the digital age 
to include data brokers that profile consumers and sell those profiles, but 
those broader interpretations have been challenged.97  Even the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), which protects personally iden-
tifiable information about children under thirteen, applies only to websites 
“directed to children” or that have actual knowledge that they are collecting 
personal information from children.98  The COPPA Rule sets out factors for 
                                                          
(Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009) (discussing Westin’s theories of personal autonomy, emotional release, 
self-evaluation, and limited and protected communication).  
 93.  To Whom Does the Privacy Rule Apply and Whom Will It Affect?, supra note 66; see also 
Sedenberg, Chuang & Mulligan, supra note 51, at 578–79 (discussing HIPAA’s coverage and lack 
thereof with respect to therapeutic robots). 
 94.  To Whom Does the Privacy Rule Apply and Whom Will It Affect?, supra note 66.  
 95.  Your Rights Under HIPAA, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/ 
hipaa/for-individuals/guidance-materials-for-consumers/ (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 96.  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2012).  The statute provides:  
The term “consumer reporting agency” means any person which, for monetary fees, dues, 
or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice 
of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on con-
sumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses 
any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing 
consumer reports. 
Id.  
 97.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Com-
pany Allegedly Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of the FCRA (June 
12, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-settle-ftc-
charges-company-allegedly-marketed.  
 98.  15 U.S.C. § 6501(10)(A) (2012).  This statute provides: “The term ‘website or online ser-
vice directed to children’ means—(i) a commercial website or online service that is targeted to chil-
dren; or (ii) that portion of a commercial website or online service that is targeted to children.”  Id.  
COPPA does not apply to websites that merely link to other websites targeted to children.  See 15 
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determining whether a website is directed to children, including subject mat-
ter, content, the use of child-oriented activities and incentives, advertising 
directed at children, and more.99  Thus, those U.S. privacy laws that protect 
particularly sensitive information may not be prepared for the new entities 
involved in handling sensitive information gathered by home robots.100 
United States privacy law is challenged by home robots in other ways.  
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has in many ways become the de 
facto federal privacy regulator.101  Under its Section 5 authority, the FTC 
protects consumers from unfair and deceptive practices, including poor pri-
vacy and data protection policies.  The FTC may well be equipped to address 
a variety of the above-mentioned privacy harms.102  But the FTC customarily 
governs a relationship between consumers and the company from which they 
purchase something, or with which they have an agreement.  This approach 
is ill-suited to protecting the privacy of third parties (non-owners) impacted 
by products that move in the real world, including guests in your home, chil-
dren in your home, or your neighbor caught on camera by your lawn-mowing 
robot.  As Meg Jones has described it, the FTC is not necessarily equipped to 
handle the privacy problems raised by the “Internet of Other People’s 
Things.”103 
State privacy law also may not cover the problems discussed here.  
Many states have attorney generals that enforce privacy via consumer pro-
tection laws,104 but that enforcement, like FTC enforcement, customarily 
hinges on a consumer relationship with a company, which will not extend to 
third parties impacted by surveillance.  States have privacy torts, including 
intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts, but these torts 
                                                          
U.S.C. § 6501(10)(B) (2012); see also 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.2, 312.3 (2016); Sedenberg, Chuang & 
Mulligan, supra note 51, at 583 (discussing COPPA’s limited application to therapeutic robots). 
 99.  16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2016); see also Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-
coppa-frequently-asked-questions#Web%20sites%20and%20online (last updated Mar. 20, 2015).  
 100.  See B.J. Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties: Protecting Reader Privacy 
in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013) (explaining that reader privacy laws 
fail to protect readers in the digital age because they target institutions such as libraries, rather than 
protect the act of reading). 
 101.  Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585 (2014). 
 102.  Hartzog, supra note 5, at 821–22.  
 103.  Meg Leta Jones, Privacy Without Screens & The Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 
IDAHO L. REV. 639, 640 (2015). 
 104.  Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 747, 749 (2016).  
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struggle to capture information privacy harms, often (though not always) fail-
ing to find a privacy interest where a person has voluntarily shared infor-
mation or is not in complete seclusion.105 
In the context of government surveillance, as one of us has noted, robots, 
like other digital technology, raise the problem of the much maligned “third-
party doctrine.”106  In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, if less sensitive (that 
is, non-content) information is shared with a third party, no warrant is re-
quired.107  In an age where nearly all information is shared with third parties, 
privacy protection vis-à-vis the government has been severely limited.  There 
have been recent signals that the Supreme Court may move away from this 
approach, but it is currently still good law.108  Because many robots will share 
information with third parties, the Fourth Amendment may not protect robot 
owners from government surveillance.  Because, however, protection for the 
home environment is so central to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, home 
robots may spark a conflict between the third-party doctrine and historic pro-
tection for the home.109 
Last but certainly not least, home robots pose a challenge for privacy 
law because of the law’s focus on one-time notice and consent.  This focus 
ignores the dynamic nature of human-robot interactions.  One-time notice 
upon purchase of a robot is not the same as dynamic feedback in the actual 
moment that a robot is observing through walls.110  Moreover, when digital 
privacy problems no longer occur through a computer screen, notice becomes 
challenging.111  What constitutes adequate notice of surveillance in a shared 
physical environment, what constitutes real consent, and whether such sur-
veillance should be opt-in or opt-out are all challenging issues for privacy 
law.112 
                                                          
 105.  Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1826–28 
(2010).  
 106.  Kaminski, supra note 5.  
 107.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 
(1976).  
 108.  Kaminski, supra note 5, at 670; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014); 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012). 
 109.  Kaminski, supra note 5, at 669–70; see also Ferguson, supra note 3, at 840. 
 110.  Sedenberg, Chuang & Mulligan, supra note 51, at 584 (encouraging robot designers to 
embrace dynamic consent models). 
 111.  See, e.g., Christopher Wolff & Jules Polonetsky, An Updated Privacy Paradigm for the 
“Internet of Things” 4 (Nov. 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://fpf.org/wp-content/up-
loads/Wolf-and-Polonetsky-An-Updated-Privacy-Paradigm-for-the-%E2%80%9CInternet-of-
Things%E2%80%9D-11-19-2013.pdf. 
 112.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, FACING FACTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMON USES OF 
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGIES 7, 12, 14–15 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/reports/facing-facts-best-practices-common-uses-facial-recognition-technol-
ogies/121022facialtechrpt.pdf; Jones, supra note 103, at 645, 652–53; Margot E. Kaminski, When 
 1002 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:983 
 
II.  TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS 
Updating privacy law is not easy.  But privacy protections may be nec-
essary for the uptake of new technologies like home robots.  Some people 
might be aware of what they are bringing into their homes—and may not 
accept it.  If there are several major privacy failures, people may throw a 
technology out.  Technologists may want to design robots to mitigate privacy 
harms both because that approach is ethical, and because without responsible 
design, these technologies are unlikely to be widely accepted or adopted. 
Regulators, too, can benefit from better understanding the role of tech-
nological design in mitigating or preventing privacy harms.  By understand-
ing what is possible through technological design, regulators can broaden a 
currently blunt toolkit in ways that may benefit both users and nascent tech-
nological fields.  We focus here on the measures technologists can take, and 
in Part III below consider whether and how the law can encourage the adop-
tion of these measures. 
The concept of building values into code or design has significant his-
tory.  It has long been a principle in Internet law that people may be regulated 
not just by law but by code—that is, by technological design.113  If technology 
significantly changes an environment, it might also be designed to mitigate 
the effects of those changes on social values.114  Thus if robots effectively 
break down the walls of your home, either by walking around them or by 
seeing through them, robots might be designed to functionally reinstate those 
walls through other technological means. 
The idea of looking to technological design to solve these problems is 
often referred to in the privacy context as “privacy by design.”  In 1997, Dr. 
Ann Cavoukin, the Information & Privacy Commissioner for Ontario, Can-
ada, came up with principles for privacy by design.115  Cavoukin proposed 
that privacy protections should be proactive, not reactive or remedial; privacy 
should be the default; privacy should be embedded into design; privacy 
should be seen as positive sum, not zero sum; designers should aim for end-
                                                          
the Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the NTIA, 93 DENVER L. REV. 925, 931 (2016) 
(describing NTIA negotiations around facial recognition policy); Peppet, supra note 3, at 140, 146.  
 113.  Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554 (1998) (“Technological capabilities and system 
design choices impose rules on participants.”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 5–6 (2006) [hereinafter LESSIG, 
CODE: VERSION 2.0].   
 114.  Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1606–08 (2007); Paul 
Ohm & Jonathan Frankle, Proof of Work: Learning from Computer Scientific Approaches to De-
sirable Inefficiency (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 115.  See David Krebs, “Privacy by Design”: Nice-To-Have or a Necessary Principle of Data 
Protection Law?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 2, 2 (2013).  
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to-end security; designers should aim for visibility and transparency; and de-
signers should respect user privacy.116  The German Federal Commissioner 
for Data Protection, Peter Schaar, later articulated six principles for privacy 
by design: data minimization; controllability: transparency; data confidenti-
ality (security); data quality; and the possibility of segregation in multi-user 
environments.117  In 2012, the FTC stated its reliance on privacy by design 
principles.118 
The principles of privacy by design are closely related to the Fair Infor-
mation Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) that form the foundation of many pri-
vacy laws around the world.119  The FIPPs were first proposed and named in 
a 1973 report by an advisory committee in the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare.120  The committee established a Code of Fair Information 
Practices that included the following requirements: no record-keeping sys-
tems may be secret; individuals must be able to find out what information is 
in a system and how it is used; individuals must be able to prevent infor-
mation obtained for one purpose from being used for other purposes; individ-
uals must be able to correct or amend records; and any organization keeping 
records must take precautions to prevent misuse and must assure the reliabil-
ity of the data for their intended use.121  A later commission in 1977 expanded 
the five HEW principles into eight principles.122  And in 1980, the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) adopted eight 
principles in its Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data.123  The eight FIPPs outlined by the OECD form the 
foundation for privacy laws around the world and are discussed in greater 
detail in Part II.A below. 
                                                          
 116.  Ann Cavoukin, Privacy by Design: 7 Foundational Principles, https://www.iab.org/wp-
content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf (last visited May 17, 2017).  
 117.  Peter Schaar, Privacy by Design, 3 IDENTITY INFO. SOC’Y 267, 273 (2010).  
 118.  Edith Ramirez, Fed. Trade Comm’n Commissioner, Remarks at Privacy by Design Con-
ference in Hong Kong 1 (June 13, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pub-
lic_statements/privacy-design-and-new-privacy-framework-u.s.federal-trade-commis-
sion/120613privacydesign.pdf. 
 119.  See DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., DHS MEM. NO. 2008-1, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE 
MEMORANDUM (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-
01.pdf; OECD Privacy Principles, OECD PRIVACY, http://oecdprivacy.org/ (last visited May 17, 
2017). 
 120.  ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973), 
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf. 
 121.  Id. at xxiii-xxxv, 40–41. 
 122.  PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION 
SOCIETY (1977), https://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/. 
 123.  OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
OECD [hereinafter OECD Guidelines], http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/oecdguide-
linesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm (last visited May 17, 2017).  
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Apart from attempts at establishing broad principles, privacy by design 
has arisen in specific technological applications.  For example, in the area of 
ubiquitous computing, or ubicomp, discussions of privacy often entail imple-
menting privacy protections through technological design.  Ubiquitous com-
puting has been defined as “making many computers available throughout 
the physical environment, while making them effectively invisible to the 
user.”124  As early as 1993, ubicomp researchers proposed “design for pri-
vacy” principles, including specific design suggestions.125  One researcher 
proposed six principles: notice, choice and consent, proximity and locality, 
anonymity and pseudonymity, security, and access and recourse.126  These 
principles largely reflect the FIPPs.  Another set of researchers proposed the 
idea of “situational faces,” whereby users could create appropriate “faces” or 
user profiles for particular environments.127  Those researchers proposed that 
designers also notify users at the boundaries between different information 
environments.128  The Internet of Things (“IoT”) raises similar issues to ubiq-
uitous computing, and has prompted similar discussions about privacy and 
design.129 
In this Part, we turn to technological design and how it might mitigate 
the above-named privacy harms.  Robot privacy is a subset of the field of 
Human-Robot Interaction (“HRI”).130  Below we build on our identification 
of robot-related privacy harms to propose a set of privacy principles, identify 
existing technological solutions, and pinpoint the more challenging techno-
logical problems that lie ahead. 
A.  Principles 
We posit above that home robots will raise three types of privacy prob-
lems: (1) data privacy problems; (2) boundary management problems; and 
(3) social/relational problems.  The FIPPs are a useful resource for addressing 
                                                          
 124.  Mark Weiser, Some Computer Science Issues in Ubiquitous Computing, 36 COMM. OF THE 
ACM, no. 7, July 1993, at 75, 75. 
 125.  Victoria Bellotti & Abigail Sellen, Design for Privacy in Ubiquitous Computing Environ-
ments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER-SUPPORTED 
COOPERATIVE WORK 77, 77 (Giorgio De Michelis et al. eds., 1993) (ebook). 
 126.  Marc Langheinrich, Privacy by Design—Principles of Privacy-Aware Ubiquitous Systems, 
in UBICOMP 2001: UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 273, 273 (Gregory D. Abowd et al. eds., 2001).  
 127.  SCOTT LEDERER ET AL., A CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND A METAPHOR OF EVERYDAY 
PRIVACY IN UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS (2002), http://digitalassets.lib.berke-
ley.edu/techreports/ucb/text/CSD-02-1188.pdf.  
 128.  Id. (referred to as the Boundary Principle). 
 129.  See generally Luigi Atzori et al., The Internet of Things: A Survey, 54 COMPUTER 
NETWORKS 2787 (2010). 
 130.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 2.  
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data privacy problems across many kinds of technologies, including ro-
bots.131  Data privacy problems—the privacy problems raised by the collec-
tion and maintenance of vast systems of records on individuals—are similar 
across technologies.  It is thus unsurprising that the FIPPs would be applica-
ble here.  But the FIPPs, as currently practiced, do not adequately address the 
second and third types of privacy harms we have identified: boundary man-
agement problems and social/relational problems.   
Thus, we begin with a selection of principles from the FIPPs, but pro-
pose two additional principles for technologists to follow and perhaps for 
regulators to enforce.  Roboticists should design home robots with an eye to 
the FIPPs principles of data minimization, purpose specifications, and use 
limitations, discussed at greater length below.  To this list, we add two addi-
tional principles: honest anthropomorphism, and dynamic feedback and par-
ticipation.  We caution that the incorporation of these principles into design 
should be an integral part of the overall design process, rather than a post 
facto afterthought.132  And we believe it important to concretize these princi-
ples with examples of actual technologies that could provide solutions, which 
we do below. 
To the extent that the privacy problems raised by home robots involve 
the collection and analysis of large quantities of information, the FIPPs are 
applicable.  The eight FIPPs, as articulated by the OECD and incorporated 
into privacy laws around the world, are: collection limitation (also known as 
data minimization), purpose specification, use limitation, data quality, secu-
rity safeguards, openness, individual participation, and accountability.133  
The collection limitation principle (or data minimization principle) states, 
“there should be limits on the collection of personal data, and such [collec-
tion] should be . . . [done], where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent 
of the data subject.134  This principle pushes back on any practice of gathering 
information indiscriminately, without a purpose in mind and without 
knowledge and consent of the data subject. 
The purpose specification principle relates to collection limitation, in 
that it cautions against indiscriminate collection and use, and requires data 
collectors to specify the purpose of data collection at the time of collection.  
(One problem for the FIPPs is a lack of indication of just how broad or narrow 
that purpose may be.  We discuss this further below.)  The use limitation 
principle then limits subsequent use of the data to the fulfillment of those 
                                                          
 131.  Sedenberg, Chuang & Mulligan, supra note 51, at 580 (applying a version of the FIPPs to 
information privacy harms posed by therapeutic robots). 
 132.  See Cavoukin, supra note 116.  
 133.  OECD Guidelines, supra note 123. 
 134.  Id.  
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stated purposes—or for other purposes only with the consent of the data sub-
ject. 
The envisioned process dictated by these three principles entails stating 
a collection purpose, notifying and obtaining consent from the data subject, 
gathering only enough information to fulfill that purpose, and using the in-
formation to fulfill that purpose—or returning to the data subject for consent 
to use it for other purposes.135 
While the FIPPs are directed towards regulators that design the laws that 
govern databases, they can readily be understood from the perspective of de-
signers as well.  The three principles of data minimization, purpose specifi-
cation, and use limitation together require technologists to know and state 
why they are gathering information before they begin to gather it, and restrict 
the use of information to those purposes.  They require technologists to notify 
and usually obtain consent from data subjects upon information collection, 
and again upon broader use beyond the expected purposes.  These are solid 
core principles for robot design, though we discuss their limitations below. 
The remaining FIPPs are more focused on the governance of data once 
it is in a database, and are thus less applicable to the robot-as-interface design 
questions we discuss here.  Data quality, security safeguards, openness, ac-
countability, and individual participation (which, in brief, is defined largely 
as a right to obtain and challenge information held in the database) are im-
portant—as is the requirement that robotics companies create data deletion 
policies so as not to indefinitely retain information for no good reason—but 
these largely address concerns outside the scope of this project.  These FIPPs 
are more relevant to discussions of informational due process136: the ability 
of individuals to understand and challenge decisions made about them based 
on big data analytics.  Our focus here is more on the design of home robots 
as an information-gathering interface with humans. 
We thus focus our efforts here on data minimization, purpose specifica-
tions, and use limitations.  Home robots should gather information only for a 
specific, articulated purpose or purposes,137 should attempt to limit the infor-
                                                          
 135.  Id.  
 136.  See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Auto-
mated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2014); see also Sedenberg, Chuang & Mulligan, 
supra note 51, at 580–81 (largely focusing on the ability of the users of therapeutic robots to access 
and amend information). 
 137.  There is some discussion between the co-authors of this Article about what constitutes 
“gathering”—whether it includes only collection that results in storage and/or dissemination, or 
whether it also extends to the collection of information stored in volatile memory but never com-
mitted to disk or sent over the network boundary of the robot.  This conversation about whether 
gathering without meaningful storage or dissemination “counts” as a privacy harm is a familiar one.  
We note but do not resolve this discussion here. 
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mation gathered to information necessary for that purpose, should avoid gath-
ering sensitive information, and should share information no more than is 
necessary for the stated purpose. 
To normatively ground the process of designating purpose limitations, 
we suggest technologists consider Nissenbaum’s concept of contextual integ-
rity.138  A robot’s stated purpose should be connected to the context in which 
the user understands the robot to be operating, and use of the data gathered 
by that robot should be limited to that context.  For example, a vacuuming 
robot like the Roomba might appropriately have the stated purpose of effec-
tively and/or efficiently cleaning a room.  It should not have the broader pur-
pose of, say, making medical diagnoses about a user.  The use of information 
gathered by a vacuuming robot in the course of cleaning a room to infer 
broader behavioral information about a user would violate that user’s sense 
of the robot’s purpose in context.  Thus, contextual integrity can serve as a 
helpful guide for establishing purposes in line with a user’s actual expecta-
tions of the technology and the information environment it inhabits. 
The three FIPPs of data minimization, purpose specification, and use 
limitation provide helpful starting guidelines for technologists and regulators.  
They do not, however, adequately address our second and third types of pri-
vacy harms.  They fail to fully articulate how a robot should be designed so 
as to adequately mitigate boundary-management problems, or how a robot 
should be designed to address the privacy harms caused by the robot being 
treated as a social actor. 
First, the FIPPs do not fully mitigate the robot-specific boundary-man-
agement problems we identify: that robots can sense through or move around 
physical boundaries humans use to manage privacy.  The data minimization 
principle may in practice counsel that robots should not gather particularly 
sensitive information, and that information may be kept behind walls or be-
hind physical barriers.  But the data minimization principle does not address 
the problem that humans may underestimate or misunderstand robots’ sen-
sory or physical capacities. 
We thus suggest a more dynamic type of notice, which we refer to as a 
principle of “dynamic feedback and participation.”139  Under the principle of 
dynamic feedback and participation, technologists should design robots to 
regularly indicate to users how their presence changes an information envi-
ronment, including by indicating when physical and sensory barriers are not 
in fact barriers to a robot. 
                                                          
 138.  NISSENBAUM, supra note 71. 
 139.  This is related to the idea of dynamic consent models proposed in Sedenberg, Chuang, & 
Mulligan, supra note 51, at 584. 
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This is not necessarily a one-way flow of information.  Robot designers 
could design robots to pick up social feedback from users, and could either 
relay that feedback to robot operators or companies, or incorporate it directly 
into how a robot operates.  Perhaps robots could be designed to detect or be 
alerted to signs of “privacy outrage”—when a user is particularly offended 
by a perceived privacy intrusion.  A robot could in real time adjust its behav-
ior accordingly or notify their companies that something needs to be fixed. 
This differs significantly from the notice contemplated in the FIPPs.  In 
framing privacy issues for regulators, the FIPPs focus on more static, one-
time notice and consent upon gathering or distribution.140  This fails to en-
courage designers to use more effective forms of notice, built-in to a technol-
ogy and recurring throughout a user’s interactions with it.141  Thus, the prin-
ciple of dynamic feedback that we propose here is not a one-time notice to a 
robot user, but a designed process of notifying a user of what a robot is actu-
ally doing, and trying to incorporate a user’s response into how the robot 
treats that information environment. 
Our second non-FIPPs principle of “honest anthropomorphism” is 
aimed at addressing the privacy problems raised by the fact that a robot can 
be designed to be treated as a social actor.  The principle of honest anthropo-
morphism is as follows: Robot designers should not use anthropomorphism 
to deliberately mislead users as to privacy practices.  If anything, roboticists 
should explore using anthropomorphic features to provide better notice to 
users of what a robot is actually doing.142 
Our five principles for privacy-sensitive robot design thus are: data min-
imization, purpose specification, use limitation, dynamic feedback, and hon-
est anthropomorphism.  Implementing these principles will not always be 
easy or obvious.  For example, dynamic feedback is a significant design chal-
lenge.  Notifying users on a computer screen is in some ways easier than 
notifying them of surveillance in the real world, because there is not always 
a clear moment that delineates the beginning of user interaction with a robot 
or IoT device, and there is no screen to post the notice on or make a user click 
through.  Some forms of notice are far more effective than others, and de-
signers should consider this.143  When and how often to provide notice—ini-
tially, repeatedly, at certain times of day or at certain changes to the infor-
mation environment—is also a challenging question.  It may make sense to 
                                                          
 140.  Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. 
REV. 952, 974, 975 (2017).  
 141.  Id. at 979.  
 142.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 31.  
 143.  Rebecca Balebako et al., Is Your Inseam a Biometric? Evaluating the Understandability of 
Mobile Privacy Notice Categories, CARNEGIE MELLON U. CYLAB (2013), 
https://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab13011.pdf.  
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incorporate the Boundary Principle idea from ubiquitous computing, which 
urges technologists to notify users at least when an information environment 
has meaningfully changed.144  It may also make sense for designers to con-
sider ways of giving users the option of different “situational faces,” protect-
ing privacy to different degrees depending on time of day, location within the 
home, or social setting (such as, “dinner with friends” versus “time with 
loved ones”). 
Purpose specification is also particularly challenging in the age of big 
data.  The purpose specification principle, again, suggests that information 
be gathered only if it advances a particular purpose or use.  If every piece of 
information is useful—for data mining, machine learning, behavioral adver-
tising, communication, or navigation—then limiting information gathering to 
a particular purpose will not do much to protect privacy.  In other words, 
some robots may have a narrow purpose; thus, their design may meaningfully 
benefit from application of purpose specification.  But other robots with 
broader purposes may have such broad mandates that every piece of infor-
mation is plausibly “useful.”  This is a problem not just for robots, but also 
for big data writ large.  We return to our above suggestion that technologists 
designate robot purposes with an understanding of how users perceive the 
robot’s role, and with the goal of preserving contextual integrity. 
Designers can still think about whether all functions are necessary for 
every kind of robot.  A talking toy may need to audio record and store audio 
recordings so it can learn and respond, but a cleaning robot probably does not 
need to do so.  A social robot may need to employ facial recognition, but a 
robot built to clean your gutters or deliver you snacks probably will not.  De-
signers can learn to think in principled ways about why they include certain 
technologies, how long (and how securely) information really needs to be 
stored, and with whom it needs to be shared. 
For example, the makers of the Roomba 980 may want to contemplate 
whether the amount of data gathered for navigation is truly necessary for the 
Roomba’s purpose: to clean the floor.  As discussed, it may be the case that 
the Roomba’s core use for floor cleaning is in fact as well or better served by 
a less data-intensive navigation technology.  A Roomba owner might be no-
tified of what information the Roomba gathers, and not just at the initial pur-
chase.  A Roomba owner might be given the option to put in virtual walls, 
not just to prevent objects from being run over, but also to guard private areas.  
And perhaps non-owners impacted by the Roomba should also be given pri-
vacy choices. 
                                                          
 144.  See LEDERER ET AL., supra note 127.  
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Not all of our five principles will be addressed through technological 
design.  Use limitation, for example, is really more about a company practice 
than it is about the design of an interface.  Purpose specification similarly and 
significantly involves company practices, though it also can involve design-
ing a technology around a particular use or purpose.  But implementing data 
minimization, dynamic feedback, and honest anthropomorphism will involve 
significant design choices.  For this reason, we next turn to the technologies 
available for implementing these principles. 
B.  Technical Solutions Using Existing Technology 
Principles are useful as a baseline, but technologists and regulators will 
both be aided by concrete examples of the available toolkit for implementing 
them.  There are various technologies that can be used to minimize data gath-
ering and encourage dynamic participation in determining and customizing a 
home robot’s privacy settings.  Some of these technologies could easily be 
incorporated into existing systems; others will require more work to adapt a 
technology for a robot-specific application. 
First, users could be given the option of constraining robot navigation—
that is, preventing robots from entering certain spaces or interacting with cer-
tain objects.  This would both minimize the data collected, including partic-
ularly sensitive data, and reinstate certain physical barriers in the home 
through technological means.  One big caveat to this approach is that such 
constraints could themselves communicate information, such as which areas 
are considered to be most important or most private in a house.145 
Private areas or private objects could be designated as obstacles that ro-
bots avoid, using motion-planning algorithms.146  Designers could add a tem-
poral dimension to a robot’s map, designating a particular space as an obsta-
cle or an open area, depending on the time of day.147  This could allow users 
to keep a robot out of rooms at some times, while allowing them in at others.  
Users might be given the option, via a graphical interface, to indicate private 
objects, regions, or time periods.148  Researchers have studied the use of 
markers to indicate private areas, versus hand gestures.149  And the principle 
                                                          
 145.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 18; Calo, supra note 32, at 198 (“[T]he way we use 
human-like robots will be fixed in a file.  Suddenly our appliance settings will not only matter, they 
also will reveal information about us that a psychotherapist might envy.”). 
 146.  STEVEN M. LAVALLE, PLANNING ALGORITHMS 105–52 (2006).  
 147.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 23. 
 148.  Id. at 32–33. 
 149.  Nisarg Raval et al., MarkIt: Privacy Markers for Protecting Visual Secrets, 2014 ACM 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE AND UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING; Matthew 
Rueben et al., Evaluation of Physical Marker Interfaces for Protecting Visual Privacy from Mobile 
Robots, 2016 IEEE INT’L SYMP. ON ROBOT & HUMAN INTERACTIVE COMM. 787, 787–88, 793. 
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of feedback could be incorporated too, by using haptic feedback to alert re-
mote operators of robots when a robot nears a restricted area.150 
Another way to achieve both data minimization and individual feedback 
through constraints on navigation is to use semantic mapping.  A semantic 
map adds higher-level conceptual information to a map, beyond mere metric 
measurements, including labels for persons, places, and things.151  These 
meaning-filled labels could then inform a robot’s decisions.  A human could 
assign these labels (“bedroom, do not enter”) or a robot could actually infer 
them if given the right information (“if bed, then bedroom, then do not en-
ter”).152  The former would likely be more accurate and more effective, but 
the latter could afford even those users who fail to assign specific labels to 
specific places some level of privacy protection. 
Constraining robot navigation with respect to proximity to people has 
been a central problem of HRI.  Researchers have studied what kinds of ap-
proach behaviors make humans most uncomfortable.153  Numerous robot be-
haviors have consequently been created with the goal of preserving personal 
space.154  With respect to mapping discussed above, it will be difficult but 
worth exploring how to program a robot to track and obscure mobile ob-
jects—such as the personal space around a particular person.155 
Interestingly, studies of personal distance have addressed other aspects 
of robot design, including eye contact156; whether robots were designed with 
                                                          
 150.  Frederik Rydén & Howard Jay Chizeck, A Method for Constraint-Based Six Degree-of-
Freedom Haptic Interaction with Streaming Point Clouds, 2013 IEEE INT’L CONF. ON ROBOTICS 
& AUTOMATION 2353, 2353; Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 25. 
 151.  Cipriano Galindo et al., Multi-Hierarchical Semantic Maps for Mobile Robotics, 2005 
IEEE IRS/RSJ INT’L CONF. ON INTELLIGENT ROBOTS & SYSTEMS 3492; Rueben & Smart, supra 
note 23, at 24.  
 152.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 24. 
 153.  See John Travis Butler & Arvin Agah, Psychological Effects of Behavior Patterns of a 
Mobile Personal Robot, 10 AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 185 (2001); Leila Takayama & Caroline Pan-
tofaru, Influences on Proxemic Behaviors in Human-Robot Interaction, 2009 IEEE/RSJ INT’L 
CONF. ON INTELLIGENT ROBOTS & SYSTEMS 5495; Michiel Joosse et al., BEHAVE-II: The Revised 
Set of Measures to Assess Users’ Attitudinal and Behavioral Responses to a Social Robot, 5 INT’L 
J. SOC. ROBOTICS 379 (2013).  
 154.  Rueben & Smart, supra note 23, at 24. 
 155.  Id. at 23.  
 156.  Jonathan Mumm & Bilge Mutlu, Human-Robot Proxemics: Physical and Psychological 
Distancing in Human-Robot Interaction, 2011 ACM/IEEE INT’L CONF. ON HUMAN-ROBOT 
INTERACTION 331, 336 (noting that people who dislike robots maintained a greater physical distance 
when a robot was looking at them).  
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legs or wheels157; and how speed, movements, and even headlight brightness 
can be scaled based on proximity to increase participant comfort.158 
One worry, discussed above, is that in calibrating robot design features 
to make people more comfortable, robot designers may give users a false 
sense of comfort.159  Users may be concerned about their lack of knowledge 
of a robot’s actual abilities—for example, researchers studying a social robot 
in the workplace could not tell its sensing capabilities by its appearance, and 
expressed a desire to be better notified.160  We thus return to our principle of 
honest anthropomorphism to suggest that such design elements be coupled 
with comparable constraints on robot navigation or surveillance, or at least 
with additional notification systems.  If a robot is designed to make its user 
feel more comfortable by lowering its eyes and avoiding eye contact, it 
should not simultaneously be recording its user from a neck-mounted camera, 
for example, without some additional alert. 
A second approach to data minimization is to constrain robot perception, 
rather than, or in addition to, navigation.161  Given robots’ reliance on envi-
ronmental information for much of their functioning, one recurrent concern 
is that there may be a significant tradeoff between utility (including func-
tional navigation) and visual privacy.162  Several researchers, however, have 
evaluated this privacy-utility tradeoff and found it feasible for robots to com-
plete tasks with effective filters in place.163  One study looked more specifi-
cally at different methods of constraining perception and ranked them by util-
ity; we return to this study and its outcome below.164 
There are multiple methods of constraining perception.  First, one could 
use methods of navigation that do not involve visual information.  For exam-
ple, robots can navigate using a depth camera instead of a color camera.165  
                                                          
 157.  Sandra Y. Okita et al., Captain May I? Proxemics Study Examining Factors that Influence 
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 158.  Zachary Henkel et al., Evaluation of Proxemic Scaling Functions for Social Robotics, 44 
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et al. eds., 2012).  
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The depth camera, however, has its limitations and only works within a cer-
tain range.166  Additionally, a depth camera is still a camera, even if it does 
not contain color information.167 
For robots that use cameras, there are a range of ways of post-processing 
images to protect privacy.  You can reduce the resolution of an image, by 
pixelating it.168  You can smooth the image by allowing pixels to influence 
the values of neighboring pixels, by blurring it.169  You can remove pixels 
and place a black box over the objectionable part of an image, by redacting 
it.170  Or you can remove pixels and replace them with what is behind an 
offending object.  The last option, replacement, is also known as “inpainting” 
or “image completion.”171  Of these techniques (excluding replacement), one 
study found privacy most preserved by redaction, then pixelation, and least 
by blurring.172  The above-referenced study calculating utility versus privacy 
found that abstracting the image provided the most utility but the least pri-
vacy, followed by blurring; and pixelation provided the most privacy but least 
utility.173 
There are additional techniques for post-processing an image.  You can 
employ brush-stroke effects (painting techniques) that incidentally remove 
identifying details.174  You can manipulate the focus in an image, which 
causes people to ignore the parts of the image that are out of focus.175  You 
can remove colors and textures, and represent 3-D models of objects with 
surface contours. 
A particular challenge for home robots is what to do about personally 
identifiable information belonging to robot owners.  To mitigate the intrusion 
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caused by facial recognition technology, designers can morph faces so that 
they are unrecognizable.176  One study explored whether de-identification us-
ing pixelation, edge detection, and abstractions could provide greater pri-
vacy.177  The study found that even with these protections, people could still 
be identified by shirt color.178  There are, unfortunately, multiple ways to 
identify people beyond their faces: clothes, gait, behavior, and when and 
where they enter an environment, particularly when people are repeat actors 
in a particular space.179 
These existing technologies can be deployed or adapted to implement 
our five privacy principles.  By constraining robot navigation or perception, 
or providing additional processing to gathered information, technologists can 
make significant contributions to enabling data minimization.  This would 
prevent the gathering of information out of context and unrelated to a robot’s 
perceived purpose.  For users to have meaningful input into the process, de-
signers will have to build interfaces.  One of us has researched three different 
interfaces for specifying visual privacy preferences to a robot.  The usability 
of these interfaces was found to depend on the scenario.  Building user inter-
faces that allow users to both know and influence what information a robot 
sees, gathers, and uses would significantly implement our principle of dy-
namic feedback. 
C.  Technical Solutions That Require Research and Development 
Some privacy concerns remain difficult to address using current tech-
nology.  This Section discusses problems that technology cannot reliably 
solve, at least not yet.  We start by discussing some limits on our earlier dis-
cussion of imposing constraints on robot navigation or perception.  We then 
turn to the challenges inherent in trying to operationalize privacy settings, 
whether they are set by individual users or by a manufacturer for all users. 
Current technology faces significant limitations in reasoning from pri-
vacy settings, in detecting sensitive objects or scenarios, and in understand-
ing context.  Robots are good at rules, but bad at making analogies the way a 
human would, or understanding context as a human might.  This makes op-
erationalizing a particular user’s privacy settings—or trying to establish more 
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general privacy settings based on shared norms—a significant challenge in 
practice. 
We then turn to notice problems: challenges around letting users know 
what a robot is in fact doing.  We close this Section by asserting that even 
with known technologies, to properly address privacy problems we must en-
gage in whole-system testing, applying and testing technologies with real ro-
bots in real-world settings.  Throughout, we explain how these technological 
challenges implicate our five principles of data minimization, purpose spec-
ifications, use limitations, honest anthropomorphism, and dynamic feedback 
and participation. 
1.  Constraining Robot Navigation and Perception 
We begin by addressing some technical limitations on the above-dis-
cussed constraints on robot navigation and perception.  These solutions, as 
noted, primarily go to the principle of data minimization: trying to minimize 
the amount of information a robot gathers while still leaving the robot func-
tional. 
Currently, with respect to constraining robot perception, it is difficult to 
perform convincing object replacement in a live video stream.180  It is hard to 
make the video run fast enough while maintaining a map of what is behind 
the object so as not to tip off to the viewer that something is missing from the 
image.  This problem may be solvable, however, in the medium term. 
More fundamentally, research should focus on how to navigate using 
privacy-preserving sensors.  To protect privacy, we might want to collect 
only a particular kind of sensor data, or less sensor data.  Robots can gather 
information in a variety of ways; cameras gather color image data, whereas 
lasers gather distance data that can be used to approximately reconstruct 3-D 
surfaces.  Navigation algorithms need to be developed to use different kinds 
and different amounts of sensor information and still work reasonably well. 
Another fundamental problem with constraining robot navigation is that 
the privacy protection methods discussed above have the potential to call at-
tention to private objects, regions, or people.  Onlookers, operators, or mali-
cious actors could use the avoidance of particular objects or rooms to infer 
both value and location, and consequently overcome efforts to obscure pri-
vate objects.181 
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2.  Reasoning from and Implementing Privacy Settings 
A second class of challenges arises around the process of reasoning from 
privacy settings, whether they are set by a particular user or by a company 
attempting to protect multiple or all users.  Setting privacy preferences and 
making context-specific conclusions from them will present difficulties.  
These difficulties largely implicate our principle of dynamic feedback and 
participation, and implicate use limitations when a company attempts to limit 
sharing of information out of context. 
In general, robots are good at following rules.  However, these rules 
need to be specified precisely, in terms that the robot can reliably measure 
with its sensors.  Since our privacy concerns are usually highly contextual 
and depend on subtleties, this makes them hard to articulate to a robot.  Ro-
bots are bad at drawing analogies and conclusions in the way that people do.  
And they are currently bad at detecting context. 
When it comes to reasoning from a set of privacy settings, it would be 
useful to be able to indicate privacy settings not just on an object-by-object 
basis but by object type.  For example, an owner might want to label as pri-
vate “all my documents,” or more specifically “all my legal documents,” ra-
ther than having to tell a robot to ignore each specifically identified docu-
ment.  There are significant technical challenges to this semantic labeling, in 
making it usable and not too burdensome for most robot owners.  It might be 
feasible for a robot to detect a document, by looking for a piece of paper with 
writing on it.  However, interpreting it as a “legal document” requires more 
work.  If a “legal document” is defined as a document with legal words in it 
(tort, litigation, etc.), then the robot must be provided an exhaustive list of 
these words, and some criteria for classification: does a “legal document” 
contain only one of these words, or 200 of them? 
The process of semantic labeling can easily get bogged down in having 
to be extremely specific about things humans intuitively understand.  Impos-
ing the burden of this specificity on robot owners and users will make them 
unlikely to create detailed privacy settings.  Thus, the challenge with seman-
tic labeling is balancing (1) not creating too burdensome of a labeling task 
for users with (2) covering enough variations in types of objects or locations 
that important distinctions are not glossed over. 
A second significant challenge for implementing privacy settings is de-
tection.  It is hard for robots to detect a type of object or situation identified 
in a privacy setting.  Take the example of credit card information.  If a privacy 
setting requires blurring out credit cards, the robot system needs to be able to 
recognize credit cards quickly and accurately enough that they can be blurred 
in every frame of the robot’s sensor feed without fail.  Object detection in a 
constrained setting is a more-or-less solved problem.  Object detection “in 
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the wild” is a more difficult work in progress, but it is solvable in the medium 
term for enough kinds of objects to make it useful.  The technology is fast 
improving, especially with the use of convolutional neural networks 
(“CNNs”) that have been trained on large databases of labeled images.182  But 
privacy protection is a demanding domain: whereas in most applications of 
object detection it is okay to just get it right most of the time, a single failure 
to detect a private object could cause a user serious harm. 
Some detection problems remain truly challenging, however.  First, de-
tecting moods or emotions rather than objects is challenging.  Second, even 
some kinds of object detection remain meaningfully hard.  Third, even where 
accurate object detection is possible, distinguishing between categories of 
similar objects is not necessarily easy.  And it is hard for a robot more gen-
erally to determine the norms of a particular situation. 
Robots will struggle to detect things about humans like emotion, mood, 
and social cues.  It can be hard for a robot to even detect the direction some-
one is looking.  Thus, trying to design a robot to detect “privacy outrage”—
when a user or owner needs more personal space or more alone time—will 
be difficult.  Ideally, a user or owner should be able to establish high-level 
privacy settings, such as “do not enter when we are fighting.”  But detecting 
the relevant information for determining these kinds of settings—scene un-
derstanding, emotion detection, and as we discuss more below, context—will 
be challenging. 
Even object detection still has considerable challenges in the privacy 
context, despite recent advances in the technology.  Implementing privacy 
settings demands high recognition accuracy, where the robot either perfectly 
detects the objectionable information or knows when it is unable to be perfect 
so it can shut off a sensor feed.  Take the example of a partially clothed per-
son.  A user might not want a robot to record him partially undressed.  The 
first step in addressing this preference is to detect when the user is, in fact, 
unclothed.  Nudity detectors could detect and mask the appropriate regions.183  
But these kinds of detectors face problems.  To program a computer vision 
system on a robot to detect something, you again must first specify precisely 
what that something looks like: its color, perhaps its shape, size, and other 
characteristics.  Saying “red” is not good enough, you have to give a range 
of pixel values that you consider to qualify as “red.”  This is hard for most 
objects, since their apparent color changes under different lighting condi-
tions, but it is even harder for things like skin.  Skin comes in all sorts of 
colors, and humans use other information to figure out where it is.  Skin is 
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usually wrapped around a human, which makes it easier to identify.  How-
ever, this concept of “wrapped around a human” is hard to articulate to a 
computer vision system. 
The more difficult underlying problem is “scene understanding.”  It is 
hard for a computer to perceive what is going on in an image, especially with 
no a priori knowledge of the context.  This creates an object detection prob-
lem for objects that look similar but have very different social meanings.  For 
your undressed user, a swimsuit, underwear, and lingerie are three types of 
clothing that might look very similar to a robot.  Even if the robot detects that 
a person is only partially dressed, it may not be able to decide what this in-
formation means with respect to its marching orders. 
Thus, even if we could reliably detect the things that we want to (skin, 
humans), many of our concerns about objects are wrapped in a social context.  
To automatically enforce this, we have to define, in very precise terms, using 
only the sensor data a robot can gather, what is meant by words like “public” 
and “private,” for example.  Doing this is currently beyond the state of the art 
in computer vision, and is likely to remain so for some time, despite recent 
progress in more constrained domains (such as labeling images on the Web). 
The broader problem behind implementing privacy settings is the fact 
that robots are challenged by context-specific factors.  This implicates both 
our principles of data minimization and use limitation.  Robots that operate 
beyond just one context will struggle with implementing Nissenbaum’s con-
ception of privacy as “contextual integrity.”184 
For example, consider a robot that cleans office cubicles, while attempt-
ing to respect workers’ privacy.  It would be hard to write down a set of con-
crete rules (for example, “do not enter the cubicle from 9–10 a.m. (my weekly 
meeting time)” or “do not enter when there are two or more people inside”) 
that will perfectly capture a preference that the robot should stay away when 
a worker is in the middle of an important meeting.  The robot should ideally 
be able to figure out when a worker is in “an important meeting”—which is 
a “scene understanding” problem, discussed above.  Scene understanding is 
made more difficult by the Frame Problem, which states that in order to de-
termine the frame or context of a situation, you need to interpret the facts you 
are given about it.  But in order to interpret the facts about a particular con-
text, a robot needs to know about the context, leaving it stuck. 
Similarly, it might be useful for a robot to detect a particular person’s 
territory or belongings, and follow social conventions for respecting that ter-
ritory.  This would include detecting the relevant properties of potential ter-
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ritory markers, such as to whom the property belongs.  Again, this is a diffi-
cult task because of the scene-level understanding required.  For example, if 
I hand my umbrella to a friend, the robot would need to detect whether the 
friend is borrowing my umbrella or if it was a gift, making it my friend’s 
umbrella now.  Otherwise, I would have to tell the robot every time I gain or 
lose belongings.  Other social cues indicating territory might also need to be 
detected by the robot, from a person’s mere presence to how they are sitting. 
In light of the significant challenges with detecting objects and reason-
ing about and from context, it may be wise to give up on perfect privacy 
filters.  A probabilistic framework could instead provide filtering based on a 
user’s desired confidence level.185  If a robot is unsure about whether a certain 
object or scenario is present in its sensor filter, a robot belonging to a user 
with a lower desired confidence setting could take a risk and not filter any-
thing.  If the unsure robot belongs to a user with a higher confidence setting, 
it could instead blur its entire feed to make sure any possibly private object 
is obscured. 
3.  Notice and Feedback Problems 
A third category of technical challenges involves creating notice and 
feedback systems for the privacy-conscious user.  This set of problems im-
plicates two of our principles: honest anthropomorphism, and dynamic feed-
back and participation. 
It is hard to participate in robot privacy settings if a user does not know 
what the robot is actually doing.  Anthropomorphic robots that fail to notify 
or provide feedback to users about how their performance differs from their 
appearance potentially deceive users in privacy-implicating ways.  Most cen-
trally, this Subsection addresses feedback in general: how to give feedback 
to users, and enable them to give feedback to robot companies in return. 
In general, a robot should legibly show whether it is protecting or sur-
veilling particular areas.  Privacy-sensitive robots should be transparent about 
both what they can sense and how they share information.  Some forms of 
notice might be simple.  A set of privacy labels on a robot could be used to 
give nearby users and third parties some information about what they can 
detect.  These labels could also be broadcast to mobile devices or other 
screens in an area, giving notice before users are within range of a robot’s 
sensors.  Labels could even be interactive, allowing users to disable certain 
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sensors or certain forms of sharing.  Some research into other forms of robot 
transparency has been done, but more is needed.186 
Transparency alone might not be enough—especially, as discussed, if it 
is one-time transparency rather than dynamic and ongoing.  Robots sense the 
world in fundamentally different ways than humans, and it will be hard to 
always articulate their decisions to human users because sensors are complex 
technological artefacts.  One key challenge is the mismatch between the sen-
sors on a robot and the five human senses discussed above.  A human might 
specify her privacy preferences as “don’t look through the bathroom door 
when I’m in there.”  Although this would work for a human observer, a robot 
might have a sensor that looks through walls.  This mismatch between ex-
pectations and the reality of what the robot can sense is a potential cause for 
concern, and challenging to address.  Other senses beside vision (for exam-
ple, hearing or touch) need to be explored for privacy protection strategies. 
Significant notice and feedback problems arise, as discussed, with an-
thropomorphic robots.  Additional research is much needed in the field of 
human-robot interaction to determine the extent to which robots can socially 
engineer increased disclosure by coaxing human users into trusting them, or 
asking questions in ways that encourage over-disclosure.  This will range 
from studying robots that invoke more trust than they really deserve, to stud-
ying robots programmed to use interrogation techniques.  Going along with 
our principle of honest anthropomorphism, these kinds of social engineering 
raise significant privacy concerns. 
In closing, although much technology exists that seems viable for creat-
ing the first privacy-sensitive robots, much work still needs to be done in 
creating whole systems that work in the field and in evaluating the perfor-
mance of those systems.  All the pieces need to be present—not just privacy 
filters, but the interfaces through which users specify their preferences and 
the software framework that decides what to do when filters malfunction.  
Whole systems like this should be implemented on real robots and deployed 
in real-world settings for careful evaluation. 
III.  A ROLE FOR THE LAW? 
Although significant technical challenges remain, technologies can do 
important work in mitigating robot privacy problems.  The classic problem 
for the law of new technologies is how to embed or enforce important values 
                                                          
 186.  See, e.g., Leah Perlmutter et al., Situated Language Understanding with Human-Like and 
Visualization-Based Transparency, 12 ONLINE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONF. ON ROBOTICS: 
SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS (2016), www.roboticsproceedings.org/rss12/index.html.  
 2017] AVERTING ROBOT EYES 1021 
 
without creating outdated rules or too strongly disincentivizing or constrain-
ing innovation.  While not intended to be exhaustive, in this Part we survey 
what kinds of legal tools might accomplish these goals.  We explore whether 
there is room for the U.S. legal system to encourage, nudge, or even mandate 
technologists to research and implement these kinds of tools.  This is a 
smaller instantiation of the more general challenges of the relationship be-
tween law and privacy by design. 
Using law to regulate design, technological architecture, or code raises 
a number of concerns.  First, there is the overarching concern that fine-
grained regulation of design can constrain technological development.  If we 
tell technologists exactly what to build, they won’t explore more creative op-
tions, and we will miss out on innovative solutions lawmakers could not fore-
see.  A second concern about using law to regulate code is with over-enforce-
ment or creating immovable constraints.  By building values into design, we 
may constrain the user experience or too-perfectly enforce the law, where 
some space for legal play may be better policy.  Third, constraining design 
through law can hide the work that law is doing.  A user may fail to realize 
that her problems with a technology are actually the result of legal policy.  
Thus, governing through code can be undemocratic.187 
Governing through code or design also potentially implicates free 
speech, as indicated in the existing reluctance to impose liability for failed 
code.  United States lawmakers and courts have historically been reluctant to 
impose liability for failed code when that failure does not cause physical 
harm.  Tort lawsuits against software producers have been successful when 
the software causes physical harm, but economic loss doctrine precludes a 
tort claim if there is only economic harm.  Similarly, consider the Communi-
cations Decency Act (“CDA”).188  Section 230 of the CDA effectively im-
munizes online service providers from liability for speech occurring on their 
platforms.189  The First Amendment has been found to protect a wide variety 
of speech online, potentially including both speech produced by code, and 
code itself.190  We do not resolve First Amendment questions here, but con-
sider them as a backdrop for our discussion of potential regulatory tactics.  
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Robot design admittedly looks more like product design, and because that 
design is embodied in a physical object, it may trigger lesser forms of both 
First Amendment scrutiny and coverage. 
What is a lawmaker to do?  Creating specific legal rules around robot 
design—whether statutory or regulatory—is a bad idea.  Ossifying require-
ments that can be changed only through legislative process or even regulatory 
process may create problems in a fast-changing area.  Codifying specific de-
sign rules may constrain or channel technological development, and could 
result in technologists missing potentially effective solutions in attempts to 
obey specific laws. 
Instead, we suggest an approach of using codified standards that dele-
gate authority to nimbler decisionmakers, with an emphasis on both iteration 
and process.191  Legislators could establish general design standards instead 
of specific rules, delegating interpretation to either courts or agencies that 
would address specific cases.  Or agencies and courts could in turn establish 
standards or principles that a number of different kinds of design could sat-
isfy.  The concern with this approach is that it does not provide much ex ante 
notice or guidance to technologists.  If a robot must protect a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy,” how specifically might that requirement be built into 
its design? 
One suggested solution would be to address robot privacy at the Federal 
Trade Commission.192  The FTC employs its Section 5 authority to regulate 
unfair and deceptive trade practices, including both data privacy and, more 
recently, data security.193  Section 5 settlements already address design to 
some extent, penalizing deceptive or unfair design choices.  In fact, FTC set-
tlement “jurisprudence” has developed a concept of notice that focuses on 
design rather than on verbal disclosure.194  Another tool used in Section 5 
settlements is requiring companies to employ Comprehensive Privacy Pro-
grams (CPPs), which build privacy into a company’s processes, including 
design.  CPPs require iteration and testing, which might be the appropriate 
approach for enforcing user-centric design.195 
The oft-voiced concern with this approach is that in the early stages of 
robot development, enforcing broad standards of unfairness or deception 
might not give adequate notice to technologists of what behavior is illegal.196  
                                                          
 191.  See, e.g., Mulligan & King, supra note 6, at 1034; Rubinstein, supra note 6, at 1453. 
 192.  Hartzog, supra note 5, at 788. 
 193.  Solove & Hartzog, supra note 101, at 598. 
 194.  Hartzog, supra note 5, at 816 (discussing the “4Ps”: prominence, presentation, placement, 
and proximity); Mulligan & King, supra note 6, at 1029. 
 195.  Mulligan & King, supra note 6, at 1028. 
 196.  See Geoffrey Mann, Time for Congress to Cancel the FTC’s Section 5 Antitrust Blank 
Check, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Dec. 20, 2012), https://techliberation.com/2012/12/20/time-for-
 2017] AVERTING ROBOT EYES 1023 
 
To address this concern, as it has with other new technologies, the FTC could 
issue guidance on robot design (perhaps incorporating our five principles) 
and host workshops.197  (Some also contend that the FTC approach does in 
fact provide significant notice to companies, with FTC settlement agreements 
functioning as a type of common law.198)  While FTC guidance would not 
itself be enforceable, it could nudge industry standards in a particular direc-
tion.  Once industry standards are established, this could in turn provide the 
basis of future FTC enforcement actions against robot designers who fail to 
implement standard privacy protections.  State attorneys general could en-
force similar state laws in the name of consumer protection, to prevent par-
ticularly egregious privacy practices.199 
In addition to settlements, guidance, workshops, and nudging of indus-
try best practices, the FTC could use some tools it has not yet employed.  The 
FTC could start requiring companies to maintain design documents.  It could 
establish performance standards, such as for user comprehension of robot 
disclosures or around user susceptibility to anthropomorphic manipulation.  
One scholar has argued that at least in the area of children’s privacy, the FTC 
has statutory authority to promulgate such standards as a rule.200  (Though, 
as discussed above, it is unclear whether robots or how many robots would 
be subject to the COPPA regulatory regime.)  Companies could be monitored 
for compliance and update their performance standards as testing results 
come in.201 
Another possible venue for addressing robot privacy-by-design is the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”) at 
the Department of Commerce.202  The NTIA has hosted, in recent years, a 
series of multi-stakeholder meetings aimed at producing best practices on no-
tice, privacy, or security in a variety of subject matter areas: mobile applica-
tions, facial recognition, drones, and the Internet of Things.203  One of us has 
criticized the efficacy of this process, asserting that in the absence of federal 
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data privacy law or other penalties, private actors are reluctant to meaning-
fully contribute to substantive privacy best practices.204 
Moving beyond federal agencies, courts might interpret existing state 
privacy laws as applicable to home robots.  For example, a court might find 
that a robot that looks through walls has in fact committed the intrusion tort.  
Case-by-case assessment of liability under existing legal regimes has the ben-
efit of moving incrementally, and being fact-specific.  It also has the benefit 
of potentially functioning like a performance standard: those technologies 
that fail to deliver adequate privacy protections would lose in individual 
cases, sending technologists back to the drawing board.  However, there are 
multiple limitations to existing privacy torts, especially in their application to 
data privacy.  Courts often (but not always) find that sharing information with 
one person eliminates a privacy interest.  Users who employ robots that share 
information with third parties outside the home may face similar hurdles. 
Of course, Congress or state legislators could craft robot-specific laws.  
If this takes place at the state level, then some experimentation with different 
regulatory regimes would be allowed.205  The risk with technology-specific 
regulation, like the risk with writing specific design rules, is that it may be-
come outdated.206  Or it might fail to address problems with data privacy as 
a whole while focusing on just one technology.  The United States already 
takes a piecemeal approach to privacy protection, although it tends to focus 
on specific sectors at the federal level rather than specific technologies.  Add-
ing new technology-specific laws to the existing tangle would add to regula-
tory costs, which could preclude smaller market entrants. 
If either state legislatures or the U.S. Congress were to pass a robot-
specific privacy law, there are significant questions about what it might look 
like.  It would be dangerous to enshrine particular technical requirements into 
a law, given the pace of technological development and the fact that better 
solutions may be arrived at in the future.  Lawmakers could instead adopt a 
standards approach, putting in place more general requirements or principles, 
like the five we outline here.  Courts or agencies could then interpret these 
principles, or could work with private actors to create subject matter-specific 
best practices.  This two-system approach—enforcing the broad principles, 
or giving private actors the option of clarifying the law by articulating how 
those principles might be specifically applied—was the concept advanced by 
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the proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.207  As long as there is a sig-
nificant enough threat of enforcement, this approach might spur companies 
to arrive at design policies that both protect users and do not unduly constrain 
the technology. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Robots in the home pose a variety of privacy threats.  We identify three 
broad types: data privacy harms, boundary-management harms, and harms 
caused by the way robots are designed to socially interact with humans.  Cur-
rent U.S. law is not well-equipped to address these problems.  Accordingly, 
we encourage both technologists and regulators to approach these concerns 
by considering robot design.  We propose five principles for designing pri-
vacy-sensitive robots: data minimization, purpose specification, use limita-
tion, honest anthropomorphism, and dynamic participation and feedback.  
These principles are derived from the FIPPs, but we note that the FIPPs alone 
do not adequately address all the privacy harms we identify here. 
We hope to encourage technologists to both adopt particular existing 
privacy-protective technologies, and research and develop further technolo-
gies to mitigate these harms.  Similarly, we hope to enable potential regula-
tors to understand both the toolkits available to technologists and the limita-
tions in what the technology can actually solve.  Finally, we encourage 
regulators to choose more dynamic, nimbler forms of regulation instead of 
requiring particular technological specifications or writing technology-spe-
cific law at this stage.  Bill Gates may have been correct that there will even-
tually be a robot in every home.208  But unless they learn to avert their eyes, 
home robots may not be very welcomed or trusted by their owners. 
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